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Abstract
Objectives: A pilot NHS dental contract was introduced in Northern Ireland between 
2015 and 2016, which involved changing the method for paying general dental prac-
titioners working in the NHS from fee-for-service (FFS) to capitation-based pay-
ments, providing an opportunity for a robust evaluation. We investigated the impact 
of a change in payment methods on clinical activity and the quality of care provided.
Design: A difference-in-difference (DiD) evaluation was applied to clinical activity 
data from pilot NHS dental practices in Northern Ireland compared to matched con-
trol NHS practices and applied to a questionnaire survey of patient-rated outcomes 
of health outcomes and care quality. We estimated the impact on access to care, 
treatment activity levels, practice finances and patient-rated outcomes of care of a 
change from FFS to a capitation-based system for 1 year, as well as the impact of a 
reversion back to FFS at the end of the pilot period.
Results: The monthly number of registered patients in the pilot practices increased 
more than the control practices during the capitation period, by 1.5 registrations per 
1000 registered patients. The monthly reductions in the volumes of all treatments 
in the pilot practices during the capitation period were much larger than the control 
practices, with 175 fewer treatment items. All measures rapidly returned to base-
line levels following reversion from capitation back to FFS. NHS income per month 
increased in pilot practices, by £5920 per month (calculated on FFS item cost basis) 
more than controls in the capitation period. The analysis of patient questionnaires 
suggest found that patients notice differences only in waiting times, skill-mix and 
number of radiographs, but not on other measures of healthcare process and quality.
Conclusion: General dental practitioners working in the NHS respond rapidly and 
consistently to changes in provider payment methods. A move from FFS to a capita-
tion-based system had little impact on access to care, but did produce large reduc-
tions in clinical activity and patient charge income. Patients noticed little change in 
the service they received. This shows that changes in remuneration contracts have 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Over the last 20 years, the National Health Service (NHS) dental 
services in the United Kingdom (UK) have faced significant crit-
icism, largely about improving access to care, but also relating 
to their responsiveness to changing population needs over time, 
concerns about the quality of care provided, affordability of the 
service and persistent oral health inequalities.1,2 Since the Steele 
review of 2009, policymakers across the UK have acknowledged 
the need to reform NHS dental contracts with providers to ad-
dress these concerns.3
The research literature suggests that NHS practices respond 
very quickly to changes made to the NHS dental contract, to en-
sure the viability of their practices. For example, changes to the 
NHS dental contract in England, in 2006, saw an immediate drop 
in the types of clinical activity that reduced profit margins for 
practices and an increase in clinical activity in areas where profit 
margins could be improved.4,5 A 2013 systematic review on the 
effects of different methods of remuneration on the behaviour 
of primary care dentists concluded that financial incentives may 
influence the clinical activity provided, but a clear understanding 
of the relationship between a change in remuneration and the im-
pact it has on activity and population health was lacking.6 A 2011 
systematic review also found there is insufficient evidence to de-
termine the effect of financial incentives on the quality of health 
care provided.7
In 2013, a change in the payment system for Primary Care 
Dentists (PCD) was considered by policymakers in Northern Ireland; 
one that meant GDPs would be paid based on the principles of cap-
itation rather than the existing fee-for-service (FFS) system. The 
main reasons behind this initiative were to contain costs, promote 
prevention of disease, secure access to care and improve the quality 
of care provided to NHS dental patients across the province. The 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in Northern 
Ireland in conjunction with the Northern Ireland Health and Social 
Care Board (NIHSCB) made a commitment to pilot a new NHS den-
tal contract between 2015 and 2016 and work collaboratively with 
academics to undertake a rigorous evaluation of the impact of the 
pilot. Dental practices in the pilot group were to switch from FFS 
to capitation-based payments (from August 2015) and then back 
to FFS after 12 months. The aim of this research was to evaluate 
the impact of a change in the system of provider payment on the 
productivity, quality of care and health outcomes of NHS dental ser-
vices in Northern Ireland.
2  | METHODS
A difference-in-difference (DiD) design was employed, which com-
pares changes over time in the two groups (pilot and control NHS 
practices), with data from each group being recorded over two time 
periods.8 Figure 1 is a diagrammatical representation of the design. 
This approach measures any change in activity levels by first cal-
culating the difference between the first and second time periods 
and then subtracting the average gain (or difference) in the control 
group of practices from the average gain (or difference) in the pilot 
practices. We applied DiD designs to analyse all combinations of the 
three time periods: Baseline FFS (August 2014 to August 2015) to 
capitation (August 2015 to August 2016); capitation to reversion 
FFS (August 2016 to August 2017); and baseline FFS to reversion 
FFS.
Pilot practices were selected using a two-stage process over-
seen by the NIHSCB. An invitation to participate in the pilot 
was sent to all NHS practices in Northern Ireland. Practices that 
submitted an Expression of Interest were then reviewed by the 
NIHSCB panel, using criteria to ensure the final practices selected 
exhibited a range of characteristics other than provider payment 
mechanism that could influence the level of clinical activity (prac-
tice size, urban vs nonurban and extent of NHS commitment). The 
total number of practices selected was influenced by system af-
fordability; the NIHSCB had a fixed budget for the pilot and had 
to ensure it could accommodate the possible fall in patient charge 
revenue (PCR) associated with any reduction in service volume. 
PCR is the co-payment contribution made by NHS patients to their 
care and for fee-paying adults, and this equates to approximately 
80% of the total NHS fee received by the dental practice. For ex-
empt NHS patients (children, those on low income and pregnant 
and nursing mothers), the total NHS fee is paid by the NIHSCB. 
The payment package for PCDs working under the pilot NHS con-
tract was based on the total payments received under the previous 
year's FFS contract, and this total was divided into twelve equal 
payments for the pilot period. The number of practices that were 
included in the pilot NHS contract was fixed by the NIHSCB on the 
basis of potential loss in patient charge revenue (PCR), which the 
the potential to meet policy goals, such as meeting the expectations of patients within 
a predictable cost envelope. However, it is unlikely that all policy goals can be met 
simply by changing payment methods. Therefore, work is also needed to identify and 
evaluate interventions that can complement changes in remuneration to achieve de-
sirable outcomes.
K E Y W O R D S
access, economics, program evaluation, quality of care, workforce
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Board under-wrote. This resulted in 11 practices being chosen to 
take part in the NHS pilot dental contract.
Control NHS practices were selected from all remaining practices 
in Northern Ireland using a two-stage process. Initially, stratified ran-
dom sampling was used to identify potential control practices using 
the following strata: practice list size, proportion of children in the 
practices registered population, proportion of adult patients exempt 
from NHS patient charges in the practice and geographic location. 
This initial process identified 45 potential control practices, 15 of 
which could not be used because of data inconsistencies, leaving 30 
potential control practices. The final stage of selecting control prac-
tices involved matching the 11 pilot practices to control practices 
using a propensity score approach, which identified 18 matched con-
trol NHS practices (remained on the existing FFS system throughout 
the evaluation). Further details of this matching process are provided 
in the Appendix S1, as is a summary of the practice characteristics 
of the two groups at baseline including the number of registered pa-
tients and the types of patients (eg proportion patients exempt from 
fee-paying).
Data were collected longitudinally at a patient level in both pilot 
and control practices by the Business Services Organisation (BSO), 
which had not been possible in other NHS dental contract reform 
pilot studies at the time of the study. In addition to using a DiD de-
sign with the pilot and control NHS practices, we also analysed activ-
ity data at the individual PCD level. The analyses assessed changes 
in provider behaviour for the average number of ‘Practice Principals 
(PP)’ in each NHS practice and the average number of ‘other’ PCDs 
with an NHS contract. In Northern Ireland, PPs own the equity in 
their NHS dental practice and receive the full NHS payment from 
the NIHSCB. They then distribute this payment to other ‘nonequity’ 
owning PCDs, called Associate Dentists (ADs) according to their rel-
ative volume of clinical activity. The NIHSCB, not the intervention 
practices, agreed to carry the anticipated financial risk for any fall in 
activity and consequential fall in PCR. The total number of practices 
selected was influenced by affordability; the NIHSCB had a fixed 
budget for the pilot and had to ensure it could accommodate the 
anticipated fall in patient change revenue due to a fall in volume of 
treatment.
All pilot and control practices were required to submit payment 
claim forms to the BSO, which enabled identification of all NHS 
treatments provided during each phase of the study. The impact of 
the change in remuneration was assessed across three broad do-
mains of outcome measure: access to care, treatment activity levels 
and finance in both the pilot and control NHS practices. Access to 
care was measured by different categories of patient registration, 
as a proportion of the total number of NHS patients on the practice 
list. One of the access measures is the number of lapsed patients, 
which is when a patient is no longer registered at the practice due 
to them not receiving any treatment from a dentist over a 2-year 
period. Treatment activity levels captured the relative complexity 
of the different treatments provided under the NHS over the pilot 
period, for example direct restorations (fillings) and extractions, pre-
ventive care, for example examinations and fissure sealants. Finance 
was measured by assessing any changes to the total NHS income and 
PCR. These outcome measures were expressed relative to the prac-
tice list size (per 1000 patient registrations), to give each practice an 
equal weight in determining the comparison of group averages (such 
as changes between study periods within and between control and 
pilot practices). This was deemed appropriate, given the different 
sizes of the practices in both the pilot and control groups.
Analyses were performed at the practice level with clustered 
standard errors to adjust for estimates of the correlation over time. 
We applied Sidak and Bonferroni corrections to the DiD estimates, 
to counteract the problem of multiple comparison.9 The assump-
tions underlying a DiD approach, such as comparability of groups 
over time, should always be carefully scrutinized and can lead to 
erroneous conclusions if care is not exercised. To do this, a robust-
ness analysis was performed using an interrupted time series (ITS) 
F I G U R E  1   The DiD design used in the 
study
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approach of selected activity outcomes, by fitting a linear model for 
each outcome over time grouped by practice.10 The ITS analyses and 
the graphical depiction of the DiD results are presented in full in the 
Appendix S1.
The research team used a patient questionnaire to capture any 
changes in patient-reported oral health knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviour as well as patient-rated oral health outcomes and quality 
of care. It is presented in the Appendix S1. The questionnaire was 
iteratively developed, with public and patient involvement (PPI) in 
two focus groups (n = 7 and n = 8). Questionnaires (n = 3000) were 
distributed to eligible (registered) NHS patients in each study phase 
(baseline FFS, capitation period and reversion to FFS), subdivided 
across the pilot and control groups and further subdivided into three 
domains used to stratify the sample: exemption from NHS charges 
(ie a proxy for socioeconomic status), gender and age. DiD models 
were estimated using individual patient responses to the question-
naire to evaluate whether there was change over time in the re-
sponse to the questionnaire, between registered patients in control 
and pilot practices.
The study was approved by the University of Manchester 
Research Ethics Committee (15236 10th June 2015), and the ques-
tionnaire element received approval from the Local Research Ethics 
Committee (Office for Research Ethics Committees Northern Ireland 
15/NI/0167 5th August 2015). After these approvals, the patient 
questionnaires were sent out and the team retrieved retrospective 
activity data from the BSO for August 2014 to August 2015. The 
team continued to receive activity data to the end of the final phase 
of the study (August 2017), and patient questionnaires were sent out 
during 2016 and 2017.
3  | RESULTS
The results for each domain of outcome measure (access to care, 
treatment activity levels and finance) are expressed per month per 
1000 registered patients. Figures are found in the Appendix S1 and 
additional tables that summarize the outcomes prior to the DiD 
analysis.
Table 1 shows the access outcomes results. The difference be-
tween pilot and control NHS practices in the number of registered 
patients increased during the capitation period, but by only 1.5 
registrations per month, and reduced in the reversion period by 6.8 
new registrations per month. However, the composition of the NHS 
practice lists had changed; the difference between pilot and control 
practices in the number of new patients and the number of patients 
leaving the practice list increased in reversion period.
Table 2 shows treatment activity levels outcome results. All mea-
sures of clinical activity, bar one (mean number of treatments with a 
cost of £280 or more, eg applying crowns, dentures or bridges), saw 
a larger reduction in the pilot group of practices than controls as the 
practices moved from being paid FFS to capitation. However, there 
was no evidence of a long-term effect from the pilot, because the re-
duction in all of these treatments in the capitation period was offset 
by an increase in activity during the reversion period.
Table 3 shows financial outcome results. The difference be-
tween pilot and control practices in NHS income per month changed 
between study periods calculated on FFS basis, which is not their 
capitation practice income but their income from the NHS if their ac-
tivities observed under capitation had been paid on a FFS basis. The 
difference increased by £5920 per month in the capitation period 
compared to baseline FFS and decreased by £5248 in the reversion 
period. This was caused by a reduction of activity in the pilot prac-
tices in the capitation period from the level in baseline FFS. There 
was no evidence of a long-term effect from the pilot, because there 
was no difference between pilot and control practices in NHS in-
come per month in the FFS reversion period than at baseline.
No differences were seen in the results between ‘matched’ prac-
tices (with propensity scores) and ‘unmatched’ practices. This sug-
gests the findings were not influenced by the choice of the matching 
process. The ITS analyses were consistent with the DiD results; the 
estimated effects are in the same direction as those found under 
DiD (see Appendix S1 for details). The same direction of changes 
between study periods to the above analysis was seen at the ADs 
and PPs level (see Appendix S1 for details).
In total, 1215 patients in pilot practices responded (347 in 
the baseline period, 316 in the intervention period and 552 in the 
TA B L E  1   Overview of the DiD access outcome results
Access outcomesa 
Baseline FFS to capitation Capitation to reversion FFS Baseline FFS to reversion FFS
DiD coefficientb  P-value DiD coefficientc  P-value DiD coefficientd  P-value
Registered patients 1.45 <.01 −1.35 <.01 0.13 .82
Re-registrations 6.00 .35 −3.30 .57 2.94 .49
New patients −0.94 .52 6.82 <.01 5.66 <.01
Lapsed and returned −27.10 <.01 −7.82 <.01 −33.68 <.01
Lost to the practice 1.96 .81 13.44 .01 15.63 0.02
aOutcomes are expressed in levels (per 1000 registered patients). 
bThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the capitation phase compared to FFS. 
cThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to capitation. 
dThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to Baseline FFS. 
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reversion period) and 1187 patients in control practices responded 
(313 in baseline, 348 in the intervention period and 526 in the rever-
sion period): an overall response rate of 26.7%. Only three items on 
the questionnaire showed a difference between the pilot practices 
and their matched controls: Responses to ‘How long did you have to 
wait for your NHS routine check-up?’ for patients in pilot practices 
increased more than control practices; ‘Yes’ to having had a radio-
graph taken at their last check-up decreased more for patients in 
pilot practices than those in control practices; ‘Yes’ to having been 
treated by a Dental Hygienist at their last check-up increased more 
for patients in pilot practices than control practices. The remaining 
27 questions used in the questionnaire showed no difference in pa-
tients’ perceptions of ‘quality’ of care provided, oral health knowl-
edge, attitudes and behaviour or oral health outcomes.
4  | DISCUSSION
The analyses showed significant and rapid changes in the patterns 
of care provided by NHS dental practices in the pilot group, fol-
lowing the introduction of capitation-based payments, compared 
to the control group that remained on FFS payments. All measures 
of clinical activity reduced significantly, except for the number of 
costly treatments over £280. This produced an average reduction 
in patient charge revenue of £2403 per practice per month. NHS 
income per month increased in pilot practices by £5920 per month 
(calculated on FFS item cost basis) more than controls in the capita-
tion period. The number of registered patients in the pilot practices 
increased more than control practices during the capitation period 
by 1.5 registrations per 1000 registered patients, and therefore, the 
practices avoided falling below the tolerance level for registrations 
(of 5%) in the capitation period that incurs a financial penalty. The 
reductions in the volumes of all treatments in the pilot practices dur-
ing the capitation period were more than in the control practices. 
All measures rapidly returned to baseline levels following reversion 
from capitation back to FFS. The analysis of patient questionnaires 
suggests that patients reported differences in waiting times, skill-
mix and number of radiographs.
The findings show a drive to expand the pilot practice register 
to ensure the practice population remained over the capitation 
contract threshold, and frontload treatments provided under FFS 
prior to capitation by finding entirely new patients to treat in the 
baseline period and getting lapsed patients to return to the practice 
list. There was a large drop in returning patients (34 patients per 
month) in the pilot practices in the capitation phase, which could be 
explained by those practices prioritizing the recruitment of patients 
whose registration had lapsed during the baseline period. This ex-
planation is consistent with the finding of an increase in the over-
all number of registrations in pilot practices by 4.38 (Table S3) per 
month in advance of the change to the capitation period, most likely 
TA B L E  2   Overview of the DiD treatment activity level results
Treatment activity  
outcomesa 
Baseline FFS to capitation Capitation to reversion FFS Baseline FFS to reversion FFS
DiD coefficientb  P-value DiD coefficientc  P-value DiD coefficientd  P-value
Fissure sealants −9.34 .01 10.38 <.01 1.03 .68
2-visit period −3.81 .01 3.45 .02 −0.41 .78
Root canal treatments −2.65 <.01 2.37 <.01 −0.26 .81
Treatments plans −34.33 <.01 28.70 <.01 −5.71 .53
Treatment items −174.78 <0.01 173.89 <0.01 −0.99 0.98
aOutcomes are expressed in levels (per 1000 registered patients). 
bThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the capitation phase compared to FFS. 
cThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to capitation. 
dThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to Baseline FFS. 
TA B L E  3   Overview of the DiD financial outcome results
Financial outcomesa 
Baseline FFS to capitation Capitation to reversion FFS Baseline FFS to reversion FFS
DiD coefficientb  P-value DiD coefficientc  P-value DiD coefficientd  P-value
Proportion patient fee 
contribution
1.45 <.01 −1.35 <.01 0.13 .91
NHS dental practice income −£5920 <.01 £5248 <.01 −£673 .60
Patient contribution −£2403 <.01 £2028 <.01 −£374 .41
aOutcomes are expressed in levels (per 1000 registered patients). 
bThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the capitation phase compared to FFS. 
cThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to capitation. 
dThe coefficient is mean difference in outcome between groups (pilot and control practices) in the reversion FFS phase compared to Baseline FFS. 
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due to the remuneration incentives in the pilot contract. It suggests 
that pilot practices may have been re-registering patients who have 
not had treatment at the practice for 2 years (and as a consequence 
their registration lapsed) during the baseline period, thereby free-
ing-up dentists’ time in the capitation period because these patients 
would have been treated under FFS for any dental needs prior to, 
instead of during, capitation. The ‘freeing-up time’ behaviour is also 
suggested from the treatment outcomes findings, as there was a de-
crease in activity delivered in pilot practices during the capitation 
payment phase.
The main limitations of this study were (a) the active NHS pilot 
period was only 1 year, which may have limited the scope for mean-
ingful change to occur, and (b) the number of pilot practices was re-
stricted to 11, due to the budget for the NHS pilot evaluation. (c) The 
scope of the study did not include consideration of any changes in 
practices’ incomes from private practice during the capitation pe-
riod, (d) It was necessary to design our own health outcomes and 
quality of care measure, due to the paucity of validated approaches 
to assessing quality of dental care in the literature,11-13 and there-
fore, the instrument was not validated. Further, there is no way of 
knowing if patients’ perceptions and expectations of care, which 
we measure on the questionnaire, match what is clinically appro-
priate. For example, whether a radiograph is taken or not depends 
on whether it was actually necessary, which we could not observe. 
(e) There was some self-selection in the sample due to the require-
ment of practices to submit an expression of interest, although this is 
true of any study requiring informed consent to participate. Ideally, 
the project would have randomized practices into intervention and 
control groups, but this was not possible as the DHSSPS decided it 
would be barrier to recruitment.
A strength of this study is that it was pragmatic in that a ‘real 
world’ service was being provided to patients as the evaluation 
progressed, so the outcomes observed could be expected if the 
intervention was rolled out nationally. This study overcomes many 
of the serious methodological limitations that have restricted the 
completeness and generalizability of the evidence in order to un-
derstand how changing remuneration systems affected patient care. 
These specific weaknesses were outlined in a review of reviews pri-
marily focused on primary medical care that included 4 reviews and 
collectively included 32 studies.14 First, the authors of the review 
could find no studies evaluating patient outcomes and none report-
ing on any adverse or unexpected outcomes. This study reported 
patient-rated outcome measures and patient-rated experience mea-
sures, although independent clinically assessed outcomes were not 
measured because, in the case of dental caries, this would have 
required a much longer follow up time and explicit consent from 
patients of the practices involved. The authors could also find no 
reviews of studies that systematically examined variable doses of 
financial intervention. This study addresses this weakness by com-
paring FFS with capitation, two interventions at opposite ends of the 
spectrum of possible remuneration systems.
The findings from this study reinforce the evidence from the 
literature that GDPs respond markedly and quickly to changes in 
how they are remunerated in terms of both the volume of care 
provided and how they provide care.4-6 It is not surprising that a 
change in patient perceived quality was not evident (except for 
three questionnaire items), given that the 2006 change in contract 
in England also resulted in large reductions in specific treatments 
(eg root fillings, crowns and bridgework) and an increase in the 
number of extractions, without any perceptible increase in service 
users’ concerns.4,5 The most robust findings we report concern 
the impact of the intervention on activity of dentists. Whilst poli-
cymakers have a keen interest on securing access and controlling 
costs, the findings we report on health outcomes are more limited. 
Care must be exercised in concluding that a reduction in treat-
ment is necessarily a bad thing, in fact it could have greater longer 
term oral health benefits for patients as a consequence of fewer 
and less complicated restorative treatments with finite lifetimes 
being provided. Long-term comparison of different remuneration 
systems ideally within a randomized control trial design with inde-
pendent clinical assessment would improve our understanding of 
the impact of different financial incentives on patient's oral health. 
However, this would be very expensive and difficult to recruit both 
practices and participants. Our understanding of the impact of 
different methods of remuneration on quality of care is also ham-
pered by our lack of conceptual understanding of quality within 
the context of dentistry and responsive, well-validated measures 
of quality.11-13
5  | CONCLUSION
Overall, the move to a capitation-based payment system from FFS 
suppressed clinical activity, including prevention. Equally, PCDs 
returning to an FFS remuneration system from capitation resumed 
activity levels to that seen in the baseline period. It is likely that a 
permanent change to capitation would lead to immediate changes 
like those found in the pilot, but that in the long term that behaviour 
in terms of access and activity would fall somewhere between FFS 
and capitation levels recorded in the pilot in response to pressures 
resulting from patients’ ongoing needs and expectations. However, 
changing the way dentists are paid on its own is unlikely to achieve 
all policy goals and therefore research is required to develop and 
test supplementary interventions that can work in a complemen-
tary way alongside a remuneration system to achieve desired policy 
outcomes.
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